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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUE PROCESS REQUIRES
PRIOR HEARING BEFORE TERMINATION
OF WELFARE BENEFITS
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970)
Welfare recipients in New York City instituted a class action alleging
that termination procedures employed by the New York City Department of
Social Service denied due process of law. Local regulations granted each
recipient a post-termination hearing with procedural safeguards such as
provision for adequate notice, the right to appear personally, to offer evidence,
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to obtain a record of the
proceedings.' Plaintiffs contended that a hearing was required before benefits
could be terminated since informal pre-termination procedures were insufficient. The federal district court agreed that due process required a prior
hearing at which the recipient was entitled to appear with counsel, present
evidence, and cross-examine witnesses.2 On appeal,3 the United States Supreme
Court affirmed and HELD, the New York procedures were constitutionally
inadequate, and due process requirements could be met only by a full-scale
pre-termination hearing at which the recipient could effectively defend his
right to continuation of welfare benefits. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Black and Stewart dissented.
Application of due process requirements to pre-termination welfare hearings is a comparatively recent development. The traditional view regarded
welfare payments as a gratuity and therefore subject to any restrictions the
states desired to impose. 4 The recipient, as a beneficiary of governmental
largess, had no right to challenge requirements established by welfare
agencies.5 Only ten years ago the Supreme Court refused to accept the
argument that Social Security benefits were accrued property rights, although
the Court did hold that such benefits could not be arbitrarily terminated. 6
Nonetheless, prior to the instant decision there were indications that the
mood of some courts was changing. A lower state court in California required
a trial-type hearing before welfare benefits could be terminated, but the
1. 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970), citing 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§84.2-.23 (1968). Local procedures
provided for notice to the recipient at least seven days prior to the effective termination
date and gave the recipient the opportunity to submit a written statement demonstrating
why aid should not be terminated. Id. §351.26.
2. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3. The trial court was a three-judge federal court whose decision was directly appealable
to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. §1253 (1964).
4. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934); Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d
901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (veteran's disability benefits). See generally Reich, The New Prop-

erty, 73

L.J. 733, 740 (1964). Most states provided for post-termination hearings for
REv. STAT. ch. 23, §11-8, as amended, (Supp.
1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §52-1211 (1964); IowA ConE ANN. §239.7 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN.
YAL

recipients. E.g., FLA. STAT. §409.19 (1967); ILL.

§261.123 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §208.080, as amended, (Supp. 1969).
5. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
6. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
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decision was reversed on appeal.7 The Arizona Court of Appeals held that
a prior hearing was required since there was no compelling state interest
necessitating termination before the recipient could be heard.8 Although
disagreeing on procedural requisites, federal courts in both Illinois and Texas
required pre-termination hearings.9 In other states, however, judicial attitudes
remain unchanged. A three-judge federal court in California denied recipients
a formal pre-termination hearing, holding that an informal conference with
an agency caseworker was sufficient.O A federal district court in Connecticut
denied a motion to convene a three-judge court to challenge the absence of
a prior-hearing requirement and dismissed the case, finding the recipients'
interests were adequately protected by existing regulations.,
Other cases
suggested judicial uncertainty concerning whether pre-termination hearings
should be required and, if so, what form they should take.1 2 The various
judicial approaches reflected this uncertainty: one court attempted to balance
the interests of the state against those of the recipient;1 3 another decided the
question by determining that the hearing involved rights rather than
privileges.24
Possibly in response to such decisions the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) issued regulations originally to be effective October
1, 1969, which provided for both continuation of welfare benefits during
appeal and for counsel to represent recipients desiring to appeal.- The
effective date was later postponed.- Although Chief Justice Burger argued
that HEW regulations would settle the issue, making a decision unnecessary, 7
7. McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379,011 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, May 2, 1968),
rev'd, 275 Cal. App. 2d 745, 80 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1969), vacated, 2 Cal. 3d 647, 470 P.2d 4

(1970).
8. Camerena v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz. App. 120, 449 P.2d 957 (Ct. App.
1969), vacated,

-

Ariz.

-,

470 P.2d 111

(1970).

9. Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Machado v. Hackney, 299 F.
Supp. 644 (W.D.Tex. 1969).
10. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 397 U.S. 280
(1970) (companion case to the instant case).
11. McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.
1969).
12. See cases cited in Comment, The Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of
Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 MxcH. L. Rxv.

112 n.4 (1969).
13. Camerena v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 9 Ariz. App. 120, 449 P.2d 957 (Ct. App.
1969), vacated, -

Ariz.

-,

470 P.2d 111 (1970).

14. Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224, 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
15. 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969).
16. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in the present case on April 21,
1969, (394 U.S. 971 (1969)), and three months later the effective date of the new regulations
was postponed until July 1, 1970. 34 Fed. Reg. 13,595 (1969), 45 C.F.R. § §205.10, 220.25. Both
§§205.10(a) and 220.25 were revoked after the instant decision, and new regulations were
issued. 35 Fed. Reg. 8448, 10,591 (1970). Apparently HEW was willing to wait for the instant
decision to determine whether the new regulations would be necessary. See Christensen,
Of PriorHearings and Welfare as "New Property," 3 C.EAINGHOUSE REv. 321, 336 (1970).
17. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) dissenting opinion (companion
case to the instant case) (dissenting opinion applying to both cases).
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the Court dealt with the constitutional issues raised, ostensibly because
some of the plaintiffs were challenging purely state programs to which the
HEW regulations would not apply.' s By adopting this approach the majority
avoided any uncertainty concerning the decision's application to jointly
funded welfare programs.
The instant decision settled several problems that had plagued state and
federal courts. The Court used the balancing of interests test that had
developed in earlier cases involving administrative hearings and procedural
due process. 19 Weighing the recipient's interest in uninterrupted assistance
and the state's interest that benefits not be improperly terminated against
the added burden on the state's fiscal and administrative resources, the
majority concluded that the balance favored the recipient.- The effect of
terminating welfare benefits might well deprive an eligible recipient of his
only means of support, and "[h]is need to concentrate upon finding the means
for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from
the welfare bureaucracy." 21 Moreover, much of the additional financial drain
on state resources could be reduced by developing efficient procedures and by
22
skillful use of personnel and facilities.
In applying the traditional administrative law distinction between right
and privilege, 2 the Court concluded that welfare benefits, as a matter of
statutory entitlement, constituted important property rights to which due
process safeguards were applicable. 24 Having established the necessity of a
pre-termination hearing, the Court enumerated the specific safeguards
required at such hearing. The recipient must have adequate and timely
notice indicating the reasons for the proposed termination so that he might
appear and refute any misapplication of rules or facts. 25 By combining a
personal conference with a letter announcing prospective termination, this
notice requirement would be met. The right to appear personally at the
hearing must be guaranteed. The Court stated that written submissions in
lieu of a personal appearance offered uneducated recipients an unrealistic
alternative, and presentation of the recipient's version of the facts by a
caseworker might not be sufficiently objective because of the caseworker's
involvement in the pre-termination investigation.2 6 The recipient must also
18. 397 U.S. 254, 257 n.3 (1970).
19. E.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring).
20. 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970).
21.

Id. at 264. See Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare

Cases, 37 Foan. L. REv. 604, 610-11 (1969).
22. 397 U.S. at 266.
23. Historically, where courts have termed governmental largess a "privilege," far less
protection has been extended than in instances where a "right" to largess has been delineated.
Reich, supra note 5, at 740. The continued validity of the distinction between right and
privilege, however, is doubtful. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
24. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
25. Id. at 267-68.
26. Id. at 269.
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be afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses where
questions of fact are involved.2 7 The Court did not, however, require an
attorney to be provided, holding only that the recipient should be allowed
to retain one if he so desired.28 Finally, the decision of the hearing officer,
who must be impartial, should be based solely on the evidence presented at
the hearing, and a written statement of findings indicating the factual basis
29
for the determination should be filed.
The initial effect of the instant decision has been to require federal and
state welfare agencies to revise existing regulations to conform to the new
standards. As a result, HEW has withdrawn its proposed regulations and
substituted new ones,3 0 which provide for continuation of benefits during
the pre-termination process where a determination of the facts must be made.
States utilizing HEW funds are also required to provide information on
available legal services to claimants, although an attorney need not be
provided. The new HEW regulations attempt to apply traditional fair hearing
requirements3l to pre-termination hearings. In theory, at least, state welfare
regulations must conform to federal regulations where the state is administering federal funds. In practice, however, a state can use such funds without
fully complying with federal requirements, 32 since HEW inspections of state
and local practices are often inadequate.33 The present decision gives the
federal regulations a constitutional foundation, which state agencies may
less easily disregard34
Prior to the instant decision the Florida welfare recipient, while enjoying
considerable latitude in presenting his version of the facts at termination
proceedings, was not allowed to confront the agency witnesses. Instead, he
was permitted, either during or prior to the hearing, to examine all information that would be considered by the hearing officer.3 5 In the absence of
27. Id.
28. Id. at 270.
29. Id. at 267-71.
30. 35 Fed. Reg. 8448 (1970).
31. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, 6400 (a). Considerable leeway is afforded the recipient: "The claimant's right to a hearing includes the privilege of presenting his case in any way he desires.
Some will wish to tell their story in their own way, some will desire to have a relative
or friend present the evidence for them, and still others will want to be represented by
legal counsel .... "
32. Scott, The Regulation and Administration of the Welfare Hearing Process-The
Need for Administrative Responsibility, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 291 (1961). At the time

of this study for example, Florida complied fully with only 26% of the federal hearing requirements and with only 8% of the "essential" requirements. Id. at 359.
33. See Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. Rxv. 326, 340
(1966); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 84, 91

(1967).
34. The problem of communicating to the recipient his right to a hearing remains,
however. Studies have demonstrated that the recipient is largely unaware of available
appeals procedure. Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare
System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 370, 379 (1966). See also Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The
Hidden Right, 46 TxAs L. REv. 223 (1967).

35.

FLORIDA MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE ch.

100,

at

14 (Transmittal No. 78, April 1969).

lOc-5 (1970).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss2/15
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specifically required safeguards, the procedures employed by the welfare
agency at the post-termination hearing were informal in nature. As one official
stated: "The hearing belongs to the client and he should not be intimidated
by it."3 6 Measured against the standards set forth in the instant decision,
however, the continued viability of such procedures is questionable.
In response to the Supreme Court standards, as well as to the injunction
of a federal district court applying those standards,37 Florida authorities
formulated new welfare regulations incorporating the new requirements. s
The revision provides for a hearing to be held at a time and place convenient
to the recipient and allows retention of counsel as well as presentation of
witnesses. In addition, a provision requiring the hearing officer to extend
to the recipient the right to confront and cross-examine agency witnesses is
included. 39 The old regulations were silent on this point.
The summary treatment in the instant case of the right to cross-examination at the pre-termination hearing may indicate that the Supreme Court
regards the issue as settled in the welfare recipient's favor. Although the
accused traditionally has been afforded this right at hearings involving
questions of fact,40 extension of the right to cross-examine witnesses at
welfare hearings may have undesirable collateral effects. For example, it
may defeat the desired informality in the proceedings. 4 ' Even assuming that
the basic informality of the hearing is preserved, cross-examination is of
dubious benefit to the recipient who chooses not to be represented by legal
counsel or who is unable to obtain legal aid. 42 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court ,unlike the lower court,43 refused to qualify the right to confront and
44
cross-examine witnesses.
The majority apparently recognized the danger of over-formalizing the
hearing process and agreed with the district court that neither a judicial
nor quasi-judicial hearing was required prior to termination. The Court
36. Telephone interview with Mrs. Grace H. Stewart, Division of Family Services,
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in Gainesville, Florida, July 2, 1970.
37. Sparrow v. Evans, Civil No. 70-12 (M.D. Fla., filed July 23, 1970). "[I]nsofar as any
Florida Statute, or administrative order promulgated thereunder, permits the State of
Florida to terminate or suspend welfare payments without first offering the recipient a
prior hearing, said statute or order is repugnant to the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution."
38. FLORIDA MANUAL OF PUBLIC WELFARE ch. 100, at 11 (Transmittal No. 120, July
1970).
39. Id. at 14.
40. E.g., Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1963); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959); ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913);
Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 190 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1951). See also Davis, The
Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing,70 HARv. L. REv. 193, 199 (1956).
41. Comment, supra note 12, at 133.
42. See Burrus & Fessler, Constitutional Due Process Hearing Requirements in the
Administration of Public Assistance: The District of Columbia Experience, 16 Am. U.L.
REV. 199, 223-24 (1967); Davis, supra note 40, at 213-14.
43. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 905 (1968): "The right to confront those providing harmful information and have them interrogated may be substantially achieved
in an informal way, and we use the term 'cross-examination' here in that less formal sense."

44. 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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insisted only on rudimentary elements of due process at the initial hearing,
but implicitly indicated that if only the minimal safeguards are afforded the
recipient at the preliminary hearing, a post-termination hearing may also
be required. 5 To avoid such a dual hearing the agency must provide for a
"fair" hearing before discontinuing benefits.
Another problem left unanswered by the instant decision is the applicability of the hearing requirement at other stages in the welfare process.4
In a companion case, the Court indicated that suspension as well as termination of benefits required the pre-termination hearing.47 An extension of the
rationale to include reduction of benefits is probable since a balancing of
interests will again favor the recipient.4 8 Indeed, the new Florida regulations
have anticipated such an interpretation by requiring a prior hearing where a
grant is modified.49 Other possible extensions may include proposed increases
and initial determination of eligibility. A federal district court recently held
the requirements of the instant case applicable to those seeking admittance
to public housing:- "Whose seeking to be declared eligible for public
benefits may not be declared ineligible without the opportunity to have an
evidentiary hearing." 5'
Justice Black, dissenting in the instant case, 52 suggested that its logical
application would be to require continuance of benefits through the entire
process of administrative and judicial review. Since discontinuing aid after
the pre-termination hearing would still deprive the eligible recipient of
his only means of existence, the balance of interests would again favor the
recipient. Justic Black also indicated that the Court will eventually reconsider
its decision not to require that counsel be furnished the recipient: "[O]therwise the right to counsel is a meaningless one since these people are too poor

45. Id. at 266-67.
46. A complaint has been filed, challenging termination in the Work Incentive Program
without a hearing: Mackey v. Sheffield, No. 399315 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, filed
April 9, 1970), noted in 4 CLEARINGHOUSE Rxv. 106 (1970) (hearing requirement applied
to unemployment compensation).
47. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970). See also Java v. California Dep't of
Human Resources Dev., No. C-69 350ACW (N.D. Cal. April 11, 1970), noted in 4 CLE&RAING(suspension of unemployment compensation requires a prior
HOUSE REV. 106 (1970)
hearing).
48. Merriweather v. Burson, No. 13630 (NJD. Ga., April 22, 1970), noted in 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 107 (1970) (reduction of benefits requires hearing); Christensen, Of Prior
Hearings and Welfare as "New Property," 3 CLEARINGHOUSE Rxv. 321, 337 (1970). But see
Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting): "[D]oes the

Court's holding embrace welfare reductions or denial of increases as opposed to terminations,
or decisions concerning initial applications or requests for special assistance? The Court
supplies no distinguishable considerations and leaves these crucial questions unanswered."
49. FLOamA MANUAL OF PUBLIC WVELFARE, supra note 38, at 12.
50. Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 311 F Supp. 795 (N. D. Ohio
1970). See also Barnett v. Lindsay, No. C. 328-9 (D. Utah, April 2, 1970), noted in 4
CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 108 (1970) (welfare applicant entitled to fair hearing).
51. Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 311 F. Supp. 795, 797 (N.D. Ohio
1970). But see Christensen, supra note 48, at 340.
52. 397 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
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